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Abstract 
 
The global upsurge of interest in corruption has led to the proliferation of anti-corruption 
instruments in international law. Such legal responses to corruption may be usefully divided into 
three interrelated planes of action: the promulgation of formal international legal instruments by 
organisations such as the UN and OECD; the work of national bureaucratic agencies cooperating 
across borders to enforce national anti-corruption laws; and the work of wholly non-governmental 
organisations such as Transparency International. The difficult task of regulating transnational 
actors, particularly corporations, requires an understanding of how these planes interact, and 
which elements would best be strengthened to further the fight against corruption. Furthermore, 
such regulation must carefully balance questions of efficacy against those of legitimacy. The 
purpose of this paper is to assess modern regulatory literature, particularly regarding corporate 
behaviour, and draw from it lessons for the development of the international anti-corruption legal 
regime. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On the 3rd of February 1975, the chairman of United Brands Corporation, Eli M Black, 
threw himself from the 22nd story of a New York skyscraper. The subsequent 
investigation revealed that he had recently approved a $2.5 million payment to senior 
officials of the Honduran Government to secure the repeal of a tax on bananas.1 This 
scandal was only one of many that were uncovered in post-Watergate investigations. 
Revelations of widespread corruption by Lockheed led to Kakuei Tanaka, the 
Japanese Prime Minister, resigning and being convicted of accepting ¥500 million in 
bribes.2 In terms of corporate behaviour, little appears to have changed since the 
1970s. In 2003, for example, former executives of Elf, the leading French oil 
company, were convicted of systemic corruption in their dealings with African 
leaders.3 Even now, South African courts are hearing allegations of bribery of top 
government officials by Thomson-CSF, a French arms and technology company.4   
The ultimate cost of these bribes is borne by the citizens of developing nations. 
In recent years, public pressure has galvanised the international community into 
action against transnational corruption. The result has been the creation of a series of 
international conventions on the subject, most of which require states to prohibit their 
companies from bribing foreign officials. The work of international lawyers, however, 
should not cease upon the signature of a convention. The task of regulating 
                                                 
1 Alejandro Posadas, ‘Combating Corruption Under International Law’ (2000) 10 Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law 345, 349. 
2 Ibid 364–5. Prince Bernhard, husband of Queen Juliana of the Netherlands, was also implicated in the 
Lockheed scandal. 
3 ‘Elfs and Dwarfs’, The Economist, 13 November 2003 
<http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=S%27%298%24%2DQ17%25%23P%21%28
%0A> at 25 May 2005. 
4 Fred Bridgland, ‘S African Deputy’s Bribe Link’, The Weekend Australian (Sydney), 4–5 June 2005, 
17. 
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transnational corporations should not be limited to the formulation of new laws. A 
more expansive and thorough approach is needed. 
Legal pluralists suggest that law must be conceived of in new ways, including non-
hierarchical, non-state manifestations of law.5 In international law, these 
manifestations are sometimes termed ‘soft’ law, as opposed to ‘hard’ law, which is 
sourced directly from the authority of the state.6 Scholars of corruption have promoted 
such soft law mechanisms under the titles of a ‘multi-layered strategy’7 or a ‘portfolio 
approach’,8 but the essential point remains the same—innovative, non-traditional 
legal approaches are necessary to deal with global problems such as corruption. 
In this context, it is necessary to look beyond the state to discover effective regulatory 
techniques. Non-state methods of regulation, particularly those involving dialogue 
that includes corporations and international civil society, can be a powerful means to 
encourage compliance with regulatory goals. These methods are particularly 
beneficial in an international system where no supranational sovereign exists, and the 
effectiveness of intergovenmental cooperation remains limited. Transnational 
corruption is a salient example of these difficulties, and also a regulatory problem 
seriously in need of innovative solutions.  
                                                 
5 Gunther Tuebner, ‘“Global Bukowina”: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’ in Gunther Tuebner 
(ed) Global Law without a State (1997) 3. 
6 For a full description of this distinction, see Dinah Shelton, ‘Law, Non-Law and the Problem of ‘Soft 
Law’’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the 
International Legal System (2000) 1. 
7 Brian C Harms, ‘Holding Public Officials Accountable in the International Realm: A New Multi-
Layered Strategy to Combat Corruption’ (2000) 33 Cornell International Law Journal 159. 
8 Thomas W Dunfee, and David Hess, ‘Getting from Salbu to the ‘Tipping Point’: The Role of 
Corporate Action Within a portfolio of Anti-Corruption Strategies’ (2001) 21 Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business 471. 
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Chapter one considers the nature of transnational corruption. It demonstrates the 
harmful consequences of corruption, its causes, and the manner in which the process 
of globalisation has exacerbated such problems. It concludes that the international 
community has the capacity to address a significant segment of corruption – the 
actions of transnational corporations based in the developed world. Thereafter, this 
paper considers the responses to corruption. For analytical purposes, these responses 
can be divided into three ‘regulatory planes’; intertwined but nonetheless amenable to 
separate analysis. 
The first plane, addressed in chapter two, involves the formal international legal 
responses to transnational corruption. These responses are embodied by formal 
conventions which require signatory states to prohibit the bribery of foreign officials 
by their companies. Though some scholars have attacked these conventions as 
culturally imperialist,9 this paper suggests that such criticisms are unfounded, and that 
the anti-corruption conventions are legitimate. 
As the responsibility to enforce such prohibitions is devolved to government agencies, 
a second plane of informal bureaucratic cooperation is produced. The transnational 
cooperation between regulatory agencies dispels the myth of the unitary state, and 
embodies many elements of what Anne-Marie Slaughter dubs a ‘transgovernmental 
network’. 10 It is in the attempt to enforce the anti-corruption conventions that they are 
revealed as ineffective. Chapter three notes that, by virtue of the size, resources, and 
geographically dispersed nature of transnational corporations, government bodies are 
unlikely to be able control their activities through threat of legal sanctions alone. 
                                                 
9 Steven R Salbu, ‘The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony’, (1999) 20 
Michigan Journal of International Law 419. 
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The third and final plane, stemming from and reinforcing the earlier two, is the 
cooperative work of a number of wholly non-governmental organisations, ranging 
from Transparency International and the International Chamber of Commerce, to 
corporations themselves. This plane forms part of Braithwaite and Drahos’ conception 
of a ‘regulatory web’, composed of diverse global actors.11 Chapter four examines the 
operation of regulatory webs, and assesses the manner in which such webs may be 
harnessed to achieve regulatory goals. It examines enforced self-regulation as one 
potential means of uniting disparate forms of regulation, and bridging the gap 
between domestic state action and global non-state action. It suggests that through the 
combined efforts of government, corporations and non-government organisations, 
corruption may be more adequately addressed. 
Overall, this paper seeks to unite two divided strands of literature—that addressing 
modern international regulatory forms,12 and that dealing solely with corruption.13 
Each provides a lesson for the other, and allows for a more innovative response to a 
difficult problem of global governance. It is simultaneously a descriptive and a 
normative enterprise; examining existing forms of regulation, and discussing how 
those forms might best be employed against corruption. Bringing this analysis to bear 
on transnational corruption allows for better informed and more comprehensive 
methods of regulation. 
                                                                                                                                            
10 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004). 
11 John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (2000) 550–63. 
12 Ibid; Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (1992). 
13 See, for example, Steven R Salbu, ‘Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and 
Desirable International Policy Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth Century?’ 
(1999) 24 Yale Journal of International Law 223, and Philip M Nichols, ‘Regulating Transnational 
Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation’ (1999) 24 Yale Journal of International Law 257. 
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I. THE PROBLEM OF TRANSNATIONAL 
CORRUPTION 
Introduction 
Transnational corruption is increasingly recognised to be a formidable global problem. 
The serious social and economic effects of corruption reinforce the need for effective 
regulation. Understanding the causes of corruption, in turn, allows for better tailored 
responses from the international community. In this context, it is important to note the 
challenges arising from the disjuncture between an international legal framework 
which privileges state boundaries, and a commercial structure which increasingly 
ignores them. By recognising these characteristics of corruption, a more nuanced 
response is possible. 
A. Defining ‘Transnational Corruption’ 
It is unsurprising that a term as amorphous as corruption is difficult to subject to a 
simple definition. Nevertheless, a useful starting point is the classic definition by 
political scientist Joseph Nye who defined corruption as ‘behaviour which deviates 
from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close 
family, private clique) pecuniary or status gain; or violates rules against the exercise 
of certain types of private-regarding influence.’14 Through reference to rules, this and 
other definitions of its type incorporate a legal approach.15 Most definitions of 
corruption are supported by a public–private distinction, in which the abuse of 
governmental roles is distinguished from private interaction. Hence, the focus is often 
                                                 
14 Joseph S Nye, ‘Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (1967) 61 American 
Political Science Review 417, 419. 
15 Shihata provides a legal definition in which corruption is the ‘deviation (for private gains) from 
binding rules, the arbitrary exercise of discretionary powers and illegitimate use of public resources’: 
Ibrahim F I Shihata, ‘Corruption – A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of the World 
Bank’ (1997) 15 Dickinson Journal of International Law 451, 455–6. 
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on the actions of government officials.16 In Nikolay Ouzounov’s words, ‘the 
predominant view is that corruption involves a transaction where a government 
official abuses a position of trust for personal gain.’17 
Transnational corruption, on the other hand, is a phenomenon significantly more 
limited in its scope. Purely domestic transactions, governed wholly by domestic law, 
are excluded.18 Explicitly included are organisations that operate across multiple 
jurisdictions and engage in business activities. Therefore, the study of transnational 
corruption deals in particular with transnational corporations (‘TNCs’), and their 
interactions with foreign officials. Nye’s definition nevertheless provides the general 
framework in which these interactions can be understood as corrupt. 
While corruption is not limited to bribery,19 it is the dominant form of transnational 
corruption.20 Concern about bribery forms a central element of most multilateral 
instruments addressing corruption. For example, the UN Convention Against 
Corruption, the most recent and highly-subscribed convention on the subject, requires 
parties to criminalise the bribery of foreign public officials.21 Similar requirements 
                                                 
16 This is consistent with the definitions provided in the major anti-corruption convention, discussed 
below. 
17 Nikolay A Ouzounov, ‘Facing the Challenge: Corruption, State Capture and the Role of 
Multinational Business’ (2004) 37 John Marshall Law Review 1181, 1186. 
18 This may include, for example, police corruption or bribery of government officials by domestic 
companies. While important, these forms of corruption are not the focus of this paper. 
19 State capture, for example, has been identified as a form of corruption which may not necessarily 
involve the offering or solicitation of bribes: Ouzounov, above n 17. 
20 Government procurement projects in the developing world, for example, are often tainted with 
bribery, be it offered or solicited: Zucker Boswell, Nancy ‘Building Effective Anticorruption Regimes’ 
in Stuart Marc Weiser, ‘Dealing with Corruption: Effectiveness of Existing Regimes on Doing 
Business’ (1997) 91 American Society of International Law Proceedings 99, 107. 
21 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, opened for signature 9 December 2003, UN Doc 
A/58/422 (not yet in force). As at 5 June 2005, the convention has 125 signatories, and 25 parties, and 
requires in art 16 that parties establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, the promise, 
offering or giving to a foreign public official or an official of a public international organization, 
directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or 
entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties, in 
order to obtain  or retain business or other undue advantage in relation to the conduct of international 
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can be found in the OECD Convention on the subject,22 and in equivalent regional 
instruments.23 These instruments require states to implement laws with extraterritorial 
effect, applying criminal sanctions to domestic companies and individuals operating 
in foreign countries. In large part, these conventions encourage parties to replicate the 
approach of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (‘FCPA’), a law that has 
prohibited the bribery of foreign officials by US corporations since the 1970s.24 While 
many of these conventions also recommend other mechanisms to combat corruption, 
it is the requirement to criminalise the bribery of foreign officials that forms the basis 
of an emerging international legal regime. Hence, while other forms of transnational 
corruption should not be ignored, this paper will focus on bribery as its primary 
form.25 Consequently, the terms bribery and corruption will be used interchangeably. 
B. The Consequences of Corruption 
The most common method of assessing corruption is by reference to its 
consequences.26 These consequences are particularly severe for the citizens of corrupt 
nations. Three particular consequences are consistently noted; diminished economic 
                                                                                                                                            
business’. Status available at 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty18.asp>. 
22 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, opened for signature 17 December 
1997, 37 International Legal Materials 1 (entered into force 15 February 1999). 
23 Organization of American States Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, opened for 
signature 29 March 1996, 35 International Legal Materials 724 (entered into force 6 March 1997); 
Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or 
Officials of Member States of the European Union, adopted 26 May 1997, OJ C195; African Union 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, opened for signature 11 July 2003, 43 
International Legal Materials 5 (not yet in force). 
24 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub L No 95–213, 91 Stat 1494 (1977), as amended by the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub L No 100–418, 102 Stat 1415 (1988) and the 
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub L No 105–366, 112 Stat 3302 (1998) 
(bringing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act into line with the OECD Convention). 
25 For a similar approach, see Ouzounov, above n 17, 1184. 
26 Most political ethics are tacitly, if not explicitly, consequentialist in nature, though some scholars 
consider every corrupt act an inherent wrong: Steven R Salbu, ‘Transnational Bribery: The Big 
Questions’ (2001) 21 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 435, 438–46. The most 
politically influential ethical alternative to consequentialism is found in rights discourse, which has also 
been invoked in the fight against corruption: Harms, above n 7, 189–90. For an interesting analysis of 
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development and growth, increased societal inequalities, and a discredited 
government and rule of law.27 
In a survey of 150 officials and members of civil society from over 60 developing 
nations, corruption was considered the single most severe impediment to development 
and growth.28 The empirical evidence supports this perception. Corruption has been 
shown to deter foreign direct investment, acting in much the same manner as a tax on 
investment.29 In addition, government spending becomes distorted through the 
misallocation of funds towards inefficient and overpriced contractors, increasing the 
overall cost of public procurement.30 Excessive spending on public projects 
consequently diverts funds away from other government expenditure.31 The 
misallocation of resources occurs not only on the government side, but also in the 
private sector. As Philip Nichols notes, ‘[a] corrupt system does not reward the 
producer of the best and cheapest product, but instead rewards the producer who pays 
the largest bribe; the rational producer, therefore, will shift resources away from 
                                                                                                                                            
corruption and rights discourse see Balakrishnan Rajagopal, ‘Corruption, Legitimacy and Human 
Rights: The Dialectic of the Relationship’ (1999) 14 Connecticut Journal of International Law 495. 
27 Ouzounov, above n 7, 1182: ‘Commentators have almost universally acknowledged that high levels 
of corruption retard economic development and undermine public trust in businesses, institutions, and 
government’. 
28 Cheryl Gray and Daniel Kaufmann, ‘Corruption and Development’ [March, 1998] Finance and 
Development 7, 7. 
29 Beata K Smarzynska and Shang-Jin Wei, ‘Corruption and Composition of Foreign Direct Investment: 
Firm Level Evidence’ (Working Paper No 7969, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000); Paolo 
Mauro, ‘The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government Expenditure: A Cross-
Country Analysis’ in Kimberly Ann Elliot (ed), Corruption and the Global Economy (1997) 83. 
30 Paolo Mauro, ‘Why Worry About Corruption?’ (Economic Issues Vol 6, International Monetary 
Fund, 1997); Shihata, above n 15, 463. 
31 Vito Tanzi, and Hamid Davoodi, ‘Roads to Nowhere: How Corruption in Public Investment Hurts 
Growth’ (Economic Issues Vol 12, International Monetary Fund, 1999). This pattern of spending 
frustrates the redistributive role of the state. 
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quality and toward the bribe payment.’32 The inevitable outcome of these problems is 
the inhibition of development and growth.33  
The social and political consequences of corruption are equally severe. Corruption 
undermines the legitimacy of government,34 and often results in widespread distrust of 
political authorities.35 Citizens have legitimate reason to be suspicious given serious 
corruption has been isolated as a cause, not solely a consequence, of undemocratic 
governments.36 In fact, Windsor and Getz suggest that ‘[t]he immediate effects of 
corruption include the destruction of democratic institutions’.37 Moreover, social 
equality is eroded by persistent corruption. The poor are further disadvantaged, as 
efficient infrastructure is forgone to line the pockets of government officials.38  
The rule of law is also threatened by corruption. As Krygier notes, the rule of law is 
dependent not only on formal rules, but also on cultural and institutional supports.39 
Those supports are eroded through a culture of corruption, as institutions become 
tainted and the trust of citizens diminishes. Ibrahim Shihata suggests, therefore, that 
where corruption is rife, ‘the rule of law … is substituted for by the rule of whoever 
                                                 
32 Philip M Nichols, ‘The Myth of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational Intrusion’ (2000) 33 Cornell 
International Law Journal 627, 631. 
33 Mauro, above n 30; Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘The Political Economy of Corruption’ in Kimberly Ann 
Elliot (ed), Corruption and the Global Economy (1997); Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘The Political 
Economy of Corruption – Causes and Consequences’ (Viewpoint Note No 74, World Bank, 1996); 
Tanzi and Davoodi, above n 31; Duane Windsor and Kathleen A Getz, ‘Multilateral Cooperation to 
Combat Corruption: Normative Regimes Despite Mixed Motives and Diverse Values’ (2000) 33 
Cornell Journal of International Law 731, 758–60. 
34 Nichols, above n 32, 632–3. 
35 Harms, above n 7, 166. 
36 Michael Johnston, ‘Public Officials, Private Interests and Sustainable Democracy: When Politics and 
Corruption Meet’ in Kimberly Ann Elliot (ed.) Corruption and the Global Economy (1997) 61; 
Windsor and Getz, above n 33, 756–7. 
37 Windsor and Getz, above n 33, 757. 
38 Rose-Ackerman (1997) above n 33, 44–5. 
39 Martin Krygier, ‘Ethical Positivism and the Liberalism of Fear’ (1999) 24 Australian Journal of 
Legal Philosophy 65, 71. 
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has the influence or the ability and willingness to pay.’40 The evidence suggests that 
transnational corruption is continuing to occur on a massive scale, perpetuating these 
problems, and many others.41 
C. The Causes of Corruption 
Legal and economic theorists have suggested a number of causes of corruption. 
Notable among the various causes are economic policies and institutional structures. 
However, addressing these causes directly through international intervention is often 
problematic. As a result, this essay focuses on the international regulation of business, 
rather than addressing domestic government policy. 
Some theorists suggest that economies that are not liberalised foster corruption.42 
Brian Harms, for example, suggests that where government intervention in the 
economy is high, the scope for corruption increases.43 However, it seems that 
privatisation and deregulation alone are no remedy.44 Corruption is also rife in 
tendering and contracting processes, a necessary corollary of privatisation schemes.45 
                                                 
40 Shihata, above n 15, 456, 461–2. See also, Harms, above n 7, 166. Notably, The Economist suggests 
that this is presently the case in sub-Saharan Africa: ‘The Rule of Big Men or the Rule of Law?’, The 
Economist, 15 January 2004, <http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=2328610> at 29 
May 2005. 
41 The World Bank estimates that five percent of exports to developing countries ($50 to $80 billion per 
year) goes to corrupt officials: Wayne Hamra, ‘Bribery in International Business Transactions and the 
OECD Convention’ (2000) 35(4) Business Economics 33. Former US Under Secretary of State for 
Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, Stuart Eizenstat, stated ‘[t]he U.S. government is aware 
of allegations of bribery in the last year affecting international contracts worth almost $30 billion by 
foreign firms, which are not bound by anti-bribery laws in their home jurisdictions’: Stuart Eizenstat, 
‘Promoting the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption in a Globalized Economy’ (1998) Vol 3(5) Economic 
Perspectives – USIA Electronic Journal <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/1198/ijee/eizen.htm> at 
21 April 2005. Windsor and Getz estimate the loss of foreign investment in developing nations at 
US$50 billion: Windsor and Getz, above n 33, 759. 
42 See, for example, Harms, above n 7, 164–5. Ibrahim Shihata notes that liberalisation is a common 
element of anti-corruption policies: Shihata, above n 15, 464–5. 
43 Harms, above n 7, 164–5. These types of economies are known as command economies, as opposed 
to laissez-faire economies. 
44 Ayres and Braithwaite note that with privatisation often comes with significant re-regulation: Ayres 
and Braithwaite, above n 12, 11. 
45 Rose-Ackerman (1997), above n 33, 36. Rose-Ackerman cites examples of corruption tendering 
processes in Argentina and Thailand. 
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It is in these corrupt tendering processes that TNCs are often implicated.46 As a result, 
Ibrahim Shihata suggests that ‘[i]n the absence of strong and effective institutions, 
economic liberalization may become counter-productive.’47 
It is the absence of these strong and effective institutions that is the focus of other 
scholars of corruption. Institutional deficiencies range from excessive public service 
discretion with insufficient accountability,48 to low public sector salaries and a 
‘patrimonial ethos’.49 However, the nature and composition of these institutions is 
often beyond the purview of the international community. States are often reluctant to 
accept intervention in domestic institutions, viewing the impact on their sovereignty 
as too great a cost.50 Moreover, intervention of such a nature is fraught with 
difficulties, and has a chequered international record.51  
As a result of the difficulties of intervention, the focus of this paper is on the supply-
side of corruption.52 Demand-side corruption, on the one hand, occurs through 
solicitation. In the case of transnational corruption this may come in the form of a 
government official insisting on a bribe before he will award a contract.53 Supply-side 
                                                 
46 Zucker Boswell, above n 20. Two examples of corruption in public procurement, prosecuted under 
the FCPA, include the sale of garbage incinerators by Tanner Management to Argentina, and the sale of 
jets to Israel by General Electric: Christopher Corr and Judd Lawler, ‘Damned If You Do and Damned 
If You Don’t? The OECD Convention and the Globalization of Anti-Bribery Measures’ (1999) 32 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1249, 1276, 1280–1.  
47 Shihata, above n 15, 465. 
48 Harms, above n 7, 164–5. 
49 Salbu, above n 26, 468–9 
50 Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ (2000) 
54(3) International Organization 421, 436. 
51 The Structural Adjustment Policies of the IMF in the 70s and 80s were generally ineffective, and 
often poorly received by the nations which undertook them: Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its 
Discontents (2002) 16.  
52 Harms, above n 7, 168–70. Notably, essentially the same distinction is often described as ‘active’ and 
‘passive’ corruption: Posadas, above n 1, 393–4. This paper does not deny the potential for legitimate 
demand-side initiatives to respond to corruption. Rather, it suggests that a comprehensive strategy must 
address the supply-side of corruption. 
53 Goodyear Corporation, for example, was informed that it would not receive Iraqi government 
contracts if it paid a specified amount to Iraqi officials: Corr and Lawler, above n 46, 1286–7. 
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corruption, on the other hand, occurs through proposition. For example, a company 
may offer to pay a bribe in order to secure an advantage over its competitors.54 The 
two are, of course, interrelated. Ibrahim Shihata, for example, notes ‘[f]oreign 
businesses, especially in developing countries, often contribute to the spread of 
corruption by assuming that pay-offs and connections are inevitable facts of doing 
business—an attitude which often turns out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.’55 In a 
similar vein, the former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed accused 
developed nations of causing corruption in the developing world through their 
business practices.56 TNCs may, therefore, be culpable for the ‘export’ of corruption 
to other nations.57 Hence, addressing the supply-side of corruption is not only a good 
in and of itself; it may have beneficial consequences for domestic political structures. 
D. Globalisation and the International System 
In the introduction to A New World Order Anne-Marie Slaughter elucidates what she 
describes as the ‘globalisation dilemma’.58 She suggests that globalisation has brought 
about a raft of problems that can only be addressed on a global scale, and yet liberal 
principles and the international system resist the attempt to locate power above the 
state. This analysis is echoed in much of the scholarly work on corruption.59 Philip 
                                                 
54 Harris Corporation, for example, was investigated for allegedly bribing a member of the Colombian 
legislature in order to secure telecommunications contracts: ibid, 1281–2. 
55 Shihata, above n 15, 462. 
56 David Hess and Thomas Dunfee, ‘ Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach: The C2 Principles’ 
(2000) 33 Cornell International Law Journal 593, 598. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Slaughter, above n 10, 8–10. 
59 See, for example, Aman, Alfred C, ‘The limits of Globalization and the Future of Administrative 
Law: From Government to Governance’ (2001) 8 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 379, 380; 
Lawrence Tshuma, ‘Hierarchies and Government Versus Networks and Governance: Competing 
Regulatory Paradigms in Global Economic Regulation’ (2000) 9 Social and Legal Studies 115, 121; 
Thorsten Benner, Wolgang H Reinicke and Jan Martin Witte, ‘Multisectoral Networks in Global 
Governance: Towards a Pluralistic System of Accountability’ (2004) 39(2) Government and 
Opposition 191, 194; Timothy L Fort and James J Noone, ‘Gifts, Bribes, and Exchange: Relationships 
in Non-Market Economies and Lessons for Pax E-Commercia’ (2000) 33 Cornell International Law 
Journal 525, 538; Nichols, above n 32, 627–9; Sol Picciotto, ‘Networks in International Economic 
Integration: Fragmented States and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism’ (1996-7) 17 Northwestern 
Journal of International Law and Business 1014, 1014–6. 
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Nichols, for example, focuses on the increasing gap between transnational activities 
occurring with little regard to political boundaries, and law generated by national 
bodies whose authority ceases at the border.60 This gap has considerable implications, 
particularly for the problem of transnational corruption. 
With formal legal authority in the international system vested primarily in states, 
cooperation between those states is a necessary precursor to any formal international 
legal regime. In the case of corruption, state discussions took 20 years to crystallise 
into multilateral agreements.61 This regulatory lag between the identification of the 
problem and formal international legal responses has led to a greater emphasis on 
informal processes of regulation. Hence, Braithwaite and Drahos note a trend towards 
self-regulation to deal with these types of complex and fast-moving problems.62 Yet, 
states are still the primary unit of analysis in international relations, and their 
influence cannot be underestimated. That influence may, however, no longer take 
traditional forms. Slaughter, for example, focuses on the manner in which the various 
arms of a ‘disaggregated state’ interact across borders, forming ‘transgovernmental 
networks’.63 Hence, the fight against corruption is occurring in many different ways, 
on many different levels. 
Conclusion 
Corruption represents a significant problem confronting the international community. 
Its negative effects are pronounced, and its causes are difficult to counteract. 
                                                 
60 Nichols, above n 32, 628. Shihata also notes this problem, suggesting that ‘[w]ith the greater 
liberalization of trade and investment, the gradual globalization of the market place and overwhelming 
advances in technology, corruption is becoming not only a common domestic problem but an 
international problem as well’: Shihata, above n 15, 484. 
61 The FCPA was passed in 1977, and the OECD convention (the first major, non-regional convention) 
was not signed until 1997. 
62 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 11, 479–81. 
63 Slaughter, above n 10, 1–23. 
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Nevertheless, one important and pragmatic means of attacking the cycle of corruption 
is by addressing its supply.   However, responses to corruption are complicated by an 
international system that seeks state solutions to global problems. It is such state 
actions, embodied in anti-corruption conventions, that forms the subject of the 
following chapter. 
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II. FORMAL INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS CONCERNING CORRUPTION 
Introduction 
The first plane of analysis—formal international legal instruments—is in many senses 
the least controversial. International conventions are among the most common and 
well recognised forms of interstate cooperation. Nevertheless, the various multilateral 
instruments dealing with corruption, both on a global and regional level, have a 
number of features that make them distinct from other conventions. Of particular note 
is the fact that a number of these conventions mandate national laws with 
extraterritorial effect—the laws apply to TNCs operating outside the physical 
jurisdiction of the state. Because such laws have an effect outside of the state which 
creates them, they have been the subject of heated academic debate. In particular, the 
legitimacy of such laws in the face of national cultural distinctions has been 
questioned. However, these questions are far from insurmountable, and this chapter 
suggests that, at least in this instance, the laws, and the conventions from which they 
are drawn, are legitimate. 
For any international obligation to be effective, it must first be implemented by 
signatory states. Two factors militate against full implementation of the conventions; 
the influence of corporations on government economic policy, and the obstacles to 
controlling state behaviour through reputation. While it is, as yet, too early to 
empirically determine the operation of all anti-corruption conventions,64 there are 
good reasons to suspect state implementation will not be comprehensive. 
                                                 
64 This is particularly the case given the UN Convention is yet to come into force. See below n 82 and 
associated text. 
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A. Global and Regional Conventions 
The anti-corruption conventions are a significant achievement given the burdens of 
international cooperation. Despite the need to collectively regulate any transboundary 
problem,65 the self-interested drive to engage in regulatory competition operates as a 
force in the opposing direction.66 States are often ‘forced to compete in offering 
favourable regulatory regimes’, and one such advantage on offer is permissive laws 
on corrupt activities abroad.67 Hence, European nations resisted attempts to establish 
international conventions against bribery, viewing such conventions as damaging the 
interests of their TNCs. 68 Only a series of corruption crises which stimulated public 
concern and increased US lobbying ultimately led to multilateral initiatives. In terms 
of scope and effect, the leading conventions on corruption are the UN Convention 
Against Corruption (‘UN Convention’) and the OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (‘OECD 
Convention’).69 However, it is instructive to first turn to their precursor, the US 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (‘FCPA’).70 
The FCPA formed the benchmark for future multilateral initiatives, and predated most 
of them by 20 years.71 Instituted in 1977 in the wake of Watergate hearings and a 
Securities and Exchange Commission investigation that revealed massive corruption 
by US companies at home and abroad,72 the FCPA outlawed the bribery of foreign 
                                                 
65 Shihata, above n 15, 469; Tshuma, above n 59, 117. 
66 Aman, above n 59, 397. 
67 Tshuma, above n 59, 128. 
68 Andrea Goldbarg, ‘The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Structural Corruption’ (2000) 18 Boston 
University International Law Journal 273, 278; Windsor and Getz, above n 33, 743, 767–8. 
69 UN Convention Against Corruption, above n 21; OECD Convention, above n 22. 
70 US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, above n 24. 
71 Goldbarg, above n 68, 276: ‘For almost twenty years, the United States was the sole country 
criminalizing the actions of its nationals, not only within its borders, but also in the international arena’. 
72 Posadas, above n 1, 348–59. 
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officials by US nationals and companies.73 The foundation of the legislative 
jurisdiction over companies operating outside of the state was nationality—the right 
to create laws applicable to nationals, wherever their actions might take place.74 The 
1988 amendments to the FCPA provided some latitude for US business—they 
allowed for a defence where payments were expressly legal in the receiving country, 
as well as including an exemption for ‘routine government actions’.75 The 
international response to the passage of the FCPA in 1977 was studied inaction. In 
fact, 14 European nations continued to recognise foreign bribes as tax deductible in 
some form.76 
At the behest of US businesses who perceived the FCPA as a competitive 
disadvantage,77 and in order to secure a corruption-free global economy,78 the US 
began lobbying for multilateral instruments that mirrored the FCPA. The earliest 
wide-ranging instrument that did so was the OECD Convention.79 Targeted, as it was, 
at the developed nations in which most TNCs are based, the OECD convention spread 
an FCPA–style prohibition on foreign bribery across most of the relevant actors.80 
Some years later, in late 2003, the first truly global initiative followed—the UN 
                                                 
73 US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, above n 24, §§ 78dd-1(a)(1)–78dd-1(a)(2). The Act refers to acts 
in furtherance of ‘an offer, payment, promise to pay or authorisation of the payment of any money, or 
offer, gift, promise to give or authorization of the giving of anything of value’. 
74 Posadas, above n 1, 389–90. 
75 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, above n 24, §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1), 78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b). 
Another affirmative defence allowed where expenses have been incurred in legitimate promotional 
activities (§§ 78dd-1(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2)). 
76 Windsor and Getz, above n 33, 743. See also, Goldbarg, above n 68, 278. 
77 Abbott and Snidal, above n 50, 435; Goldbarg, above n 68, 278; Posadas, above n 1, 376; Windsor 
and Getz, above n 33, 761. 
78 Windsor and Getz, above n 33, 770–1: ‘[t]he United States recognized that its own interests would be 
served if corruption suppression were multilateral. However, the United States also apparently was 
committed to a corruption-free global economy as a moral good’. 
79 For discussion of the details of the OECD convention see, especially, Corr and Lawler, above n 46, 
1303–10. See also Posadas, above n 1, 380; Nichols, above n 32, 636; Harms, above n 7, 176–7; 
Windsor and Getz, above n 33, 732. 
80 OECD Convention, above n 22, art 1.1; Windsor and Getz, above n 33, 767–8; Nichols, above n 32, 
638-9. The OECD Convention has 34 signatories – the 29 members of the OECD, and 5 non–member 
signatories.  
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Convention Against Corruption. With 123 signatories, it is the most highly subscribed 
of all the anti-corruption treaties.81 As a relatively recent convention, it does not yet 
have enough ratifications to come into force.82 It is, however, likely to become so in 
the coming year, further spreading the prohibition on foreign bribery.83 
Alongside the increase in multilateral conventions has been an increase in regional 
conventions. The Organisation of American States, the European Union and the 
African Union all have treaties on similar subject matter.84 While varying somewhat 
in scope and application, they generally replicate the FCPA prohibition of bribery of 
foreign officials.85 These conventions contribute to the interlocking network of laws 
which, operating collectively, apply to the vast bulk of TNCs. 
B. Corruption, Culture and Compulsion 
Laws with extraterritorial effect, while not uncommon in domestic legislation, are 
rarely sponsored by international conventions. By their very nature, extraterritorially 
effective laws will have an effect in other jurisdictions, and this effect has been 
viewed by some scholars as an unwarranted intrusion into the culture and affairs of 
other nations. Steven Salbu, in particular, has forcefully argued against the spread of 
prohibitions on bribery of foreign officials on this basis.86 Salbu’s arguments are 
                                                 
81 Status available at 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty18.asp>. 
82 The UN Convention, as at 5 June 2005 has 25 ratifications. It requires, per art 68 of the Convention, 
30 ratifications to come into force. Status available at 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty18.asp>. 
83 UN Convention Against Corruption, above n 21, art 16. 
84 Organization of American States Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, above n 23; 
Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or 
Officials of Member States of the European Union, above n 23; African Union Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Corruption, above n 23. 
85 Windsor and Getz, above n 33, 733. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, above n 23, art 
5; African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, above n 23, arts 4–5. See 
generally, W Paatii Ofosu-Amaah, Raj Soopramanien and Kishor Uprety, Combating Corruption (1999) 
70–8. 
86 Salbu, above n 9; Salbu, above n 13; Salbu, above n 26. 
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twofold. First, the conventions ignore cultural differences and are unjustifiably 
intrusive into the affairs of other nations. Secondly, if not actually intrusive, they are 
perceived as such, and developing nations resent their application. Close examination 
reveals that the conventions do not have the consequences Salbu suggests. Moreover, 
the conventions are independently justifiable on principle, to the extent that they do 
affect other nations. 
It is clear that there is a distinction in many cultures between legitimate gift-giving 
practices and illegitimate corruption. Salbu notes, in particular, Asian and African 
traditions of gift-giving,87 and anthropologists have observed ritualised gift-giving as 
social traditions of the indigenous inhabitants of New Zealand and other Pacific 
Islands.88 However, the mere identification of such practices does not necessarily 
entail that a prohibition on transnational bribery would erode them. It is useful in this 
sense to note that TNCs are typically engaged in ‘grand’ corruption, rather than the 
kind of ‘petty’ corruption that might be confused with gift-giving.89  In fact, Nikolay 
Ouzounov suggests that ‘grand bribery is the hallmark of major multinational 
corporations dealing at the highest governmental levels.’90 It is difficult to paint major 
corruption in tendering for contracts as in any way implicated in culturally legitimate 
gift-giving practices. 
                                                 
87 Salbu, above n 13, 232–9, 243–6. 
88 Fort and Noone, above n 59, 531–6. See also Alejandro Posadas, above n 1, 387 noting the Korean 
custom of ‘rice cake expenses’. 
89 Ouzounov, above n 17, 1186–9. Petty bribery tends to be small amounts, often to ensure that an 
official undertakes a duty they were already obliged to do. In terms of transnational corporations these 
may be equated to the ‘routine government actions’ referred to in the FCPA; see above n 75 and 
associated text. Grand bribery, on the other hand, is ‘often to gain a competitive advantage over other 
market participants in contract bidding’: Ouzounov, above n 17, 1188. 
90 Ibid, 1188. Note also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, 
and Reform (1999), 23: ‘corrupt payments to win major contracts and concessions are generally the 
preserve of large businesses and high-level officials’. 
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Moreover, to the extent that businesses seek to engage with local cultural practices, 
the major conventions allow for such customs. The FCPA, for example, allows 
payments which are legal in the receiving country, and has done so since 1988 while 
remaining concordant with international conventions.91 Moreover, as Nichols notes, it 
is overly pessimistic to suggest that judges are so ethnocentric that they could not 
distinguish between a legitimate gift and a bribe in the application of anti-bribery 
laws.92 In short, it seems highly unlikely that the application of such laws would 
impinge on the gift-giving practices of other cultures. 
Salbu has suggested, in the alternative, that even if the anti-bribery laws do not in fact 
affect cultural practices, they are at least perceived as unnecessarily intrusive.93 This 
contention is baseless, particularly given the history of the FCPA. As Philip Nichols 
notes, ‘[i]n those twenty years [of the FCPA], not one meaningful diplomatic rift can 
be attributed to the enforcement of the Act.’94 Add to this the fact that the UN 
Convention is widely supported by developing countries and there seems little reason 
to suspect a backlash against such laws motivated by a charge of cultural 
imperialism.95 
The specifics of the conventions must be considered in combination with the 
legitimacy of intervening in the affairs of other nations. Whether out of respect for the 
                                                 
91 See above n 75 and associated text. The OECD Convention allows for ‘small facilitation payments’: 
Posadas, combating corruption, 387. There is seems little reason to believe that the UN Convention will 
operate any differently. The US, for example, has not indicated that it will further amend the FCPA. 
92 Nichols, above n 13, 296–7. 
93 Salbu, above n 13, 231–2. See also Harms, above n 7, 185–7, and Kenneth U Surjadinata, ‘Revisiting 
Corrupt Practices from the Market Perspective’ (1998) 12 Emory International Law Review 1021, 1036: 
‘Developing states perceive extraterritorial application of value-based laws [like the FCPA] as a legally 
disguised attempt to impose western values’. 
94 Nichols, above n 32, 646. Note also that Kate Gillespie, in a 1987 study of Middle East government, 
found little negative response to the FCPA: Gillespie, Kate, ‘Middle East Response to the US Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act’ (1987) 39(4) California Management Review 9, 28. 
95 UN Convention Against Corruption, above n 21. 
Transnational Corruption  June 2005 
 
 
 - 23 - 
principle of sovereignty, or purely out of caution, intervention demands a higher 
threshold of justification than ordinary international policies. In the case of 
transnational bribery, it is important to note that the extent of intervention is limited. 
The subjects of regulation are TNCs, not the citizens of foreign nations, even when 
such citizens solicit bribes. Obviously, this regulation will have an influence on the 
manner in which business–government relations occur in other nations,96 but that 
regulation is not direct—only TNCs of the legislating state’s nationality are 
compelled to change their behaviour. Nationality is an uncontroversial foundation for 
extraterritorial laws, and Nichols suggests that such regulation is ‘unremarkable in 
both a legal and ethical sense’.97 Moreover, now that a large number of countries have 
signed the UN Convention, they have explicitly demonstrated a willingness to be 
subject to such laws. 
Additionally, the norm prohibiting corruption is universal enough, and serious enough, 
to warrant the broad application of anti-bribery laws. Bribery is a crime in every 
country of the world, is condemned by major religious bodies, and is condemned by 
those who suffer from it.98 Given that it is largely Western companies that engage in 
transnational bribery, Western nations have an obligation to regulate their actions. As 
Dr Frene Ginwalla, Speaker of the South African Parliament, eloquently stated, 
‘attributing corruption to [African] cultures is both arrogant and racist, as well as 
convenient and self-serving. It says more about the culture of [the West], than our 
own.’99  
                                                 
96 Salbu, above n 13, 253. 
97 Nichols, above n 32, 650. See also Posadas, above n 1, 389–90. 
98 Nichols, above n 13, 277–8; Nichols, above n 32, 629. 
99 Reported in Nichols, above n 13, 274. 
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C. States and Implementation 
Many international conventions are primarily designed to circumscribe the actions of 
states.100 In contrast, the anti-corruption conventions require states to promulgate laws 
for the purpose of regulating the behaviour of third parties—transnational 
corporations. Implementation is therefore a question of degree—of the extent to 
which the state has altered the behaviour of TNCs101—rather than a simple question of 
whether the relevant prohibition has been instituted into law. The relationship 
between states and corporations significantly influences the degree to which states 
commit themselves to implementation. 
Regulatory competition, by providing an incentive for lax inplementation, frustrates 
the goals of the conventions.102 As Koenig-Archibugi suggests, ‘[r]egulatory 
competition impairs the accountability relationship between governments and TNCs, 
since it induces the principal to relax its demands on the agent and to abstain from 
punishment for fear that the agent will move to the jurisdiction of another 
principal.’103 Even where there is little fear that corporations will move offshore, the 
state may yield to the demands of business for economic benefits. This appears to 
have been the motivation behind the UK Export Credits Guarantee Department’s 
revocation of its policy requiring disclosure of secret commission agents—a 
mechanism commonly used to conceal bribery.104 Corporations, therefore, have 
                                                 
100 For example, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature 1 July 
1968, 729 UNTS 161 (entered into force 5 March 1970) focuses on state military and security policy 
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature 30 October 1947, 55 UNTS 187 
(entered into force 1 January 1948) focuses on state trade policy. 
101 Windsor and Getz, above n 33, 765. 
102 For a fuller explanation of regulatory competition, see Aman, above n 59, 397; Tshuma, above n 59, 
128. 
103 Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, ‘Transnational Corporations and Public Accountability’ (2004) 39(2) 
Government and Opposition 234, 242. 
104 David Leigh and Rob Evans, ‘Minister, How Far You’ve Come’, The Guardian, 25 January 2005 
<http://politics.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,9115,1397961,00.html> at 13 February 2005. 
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political influence due to their economic importance, and often exercise that influence 
to weaken state policies disadvantageous to them. 
Moreover, the means of ensuring that states comply with international conventions are 
weakened where third party regulation is involved. One of the lessons of institutional 
theory in international relations literature is that reputation is a key motivating factor 
in compliance with international obligations.105 Where a state fails to meet an 
international obligation, its resulting poor reputation can deny it the benefits of 
cooperation in the future.106 Furthermore, as Keohane notes, the element of prestige 
among one’s global peers is rarely far from the minds of executive politicians.107 Yet 
even the moderate compliance push of reputation is limited by the separation between 
corporation and state. It is difficult to hold a state responsible, even reputationally, for 
an action undertaken by a corporation,108 even if that action was loosely facilitated by 
under-enforcement on the part of the state. 
Conclusion 
Though globalisation continues to transform the international legal and political 
landscape, states remain central elements of any regime. State-centred instruments, 
such as the UN Convention and the OECD Convention, have dominated the fight 
against corruption in recent years. Suggestions that such instruments are illegitimate 
due to cultural diversity do not stand up to critical analysis. However, while the 
conventions are legitimate, serious questions remain about their effectiveness. It is as 
                                                 
105 Robert O Keohane, ‘Governance in Partially Globalized World: Presidential Address, American 
Political Science Association, 2000’ (2001) 95 The American Political Science Review 1, 7; Abbott and 
Snidal, above n 50, 427. 
106 Abbott and Snidal, above n 50, 427. 
107 Keohane, above n 105, 8. 
108 The ongoing debate about state responsibility for the actions of individuals within its borders 
demonstrates the persistent disagreement over what can be attributed to the state. See, for some 
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yet too early to determine whether the nascent legal regime will be adequately 
implemented by states, though there is at least some reason to believe that it will not 
be. Of even greater concern is whether or not the arms of government vested with the 
responsibility to enforce extraterritorial laws are capable of doing so, and that 
question forms the basis of the following chapter. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
disputed principles, International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (26 July 2001). 
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III.  THE TRANSGOVERNMENTAL NETWORK 
AGAINST CORRUPTION 
Introduction 
The multilateral anti-corruption conventions impose on parties an obligation to 
prohibit the bribery of foreign officials. That responsibility inevitably devolves to a 
bureaucratic agency enforcing the law on behalf of the state. Moreover, given the 
extraterritorial nature of the laws, their enforcement requires cooperation with similar 
bureaucratic agencies in other nations. The result can be characterised in terms of 
what Anne-Marie Slaughter labels a ‘transgovernmental network’.109 It is through 
such a network that the actual enforcement of anti-bribery laws occurs. 
The idea of a transgovernmental anti-corruption network, however, is not without 
practical and theoretical problems. This chapter contends that the anti-corruption 
network is unlikely to ever be sufficiently effective to control corporate behaviour 
without additional supporting measures. While networks may encourage transnational 
cooperation, they cannot overcome all the challenges of the international system. 
Moreover, the very concept of a network, as envisaged by Slaughter, raises serious 
issues of legitimacy. Indeed, the case study of corruption may provide lessons for the 
analysis and creation of future networks. 
A. Transgovernmental Networks 
Anne-Marie Slaughter suggests that the response to the globalisation dilemma is, and 
should be, the generation of transgovernmental networks.110 Slaughter defines such a 
network as ‘a pattern of regular and purposive relations among like government units 
working across the borders that divide countries from one another and that demarcate 
                                                 
109 Slaughter, above n 10. 
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the “domestic” from the “international” sphere.’111 In her taxonomy of networks, 
Slaughter identifies horizontal enforcement networks as a particular type,112 and it is 
into this category that the anti-corruption network most neatly falls. This kind of 
network typically arises ‘due to the inability of government officials in one country to 
enforce that country’s laws.’113 
According to Slaughter, the driving force behind the development of 
transgovernmental networks is the ‘disaggregation’ of the state.114 By this term, 
Slaughter refers to the fact that the state can no longer be considered unitary—an 
actor which operates coherently as a single entity. Instead, she suggests that agencies 
within the state must be considered relatively independent actors, capable of acting 
across national borders without recourse to formal interstate relations.115 It is these 
agencies that form the nodes in trangovernmental networks. 
Kanishka Jayasuriya provides a complementary analysis, suggesting that the 
independence of government agencies has brought about a situation of ‘complex 
sovereignty’.116 He suggests that where national agencies address global issues, they 
take on an ‘international function’.117 Moreover, in taking on such a function, they 
naturally develop a greater degree of autonomy within the state.118 The increasing role 
of government agencies is consistent with other regulatory trends. For example, 
                                                                                                                                            
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid, 14. 
112 Ibid, 19, 55–8. The network is horizontal in that it operates between formally equal states, without 
recourse to any higher institutional authority. 
113 Ibid, 19. 
114 Ibid, 12–15. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Kanishka Jayasuriya, ‘Globalization, Law and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergence 
of Global Regulatory Governance’ (1999) 6 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 425. 
117 Ibid, 446–7. 
118 Ibid, 438. 
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Imelda Maher suggests that the move towards transgovernmental networks is ‘a 
mirroring of the trend towards the regulatory state with increased delegation of 
regulatory authority to specialist agencies.’119 As a result, the international sphere can 
be conceptualised in terms of interactions between government agencies, rather than 
only interactions between states. 
Slaughter foresees that such networks could come to pass as the result of international 
agreements,120 as in the case of the anti-corruption network.121 Keohane and Nye 
suggest that conventions, by suggesting an issue is resolved, can depoliticise issues 
such that ‘particular questions can be settled at lower levels of government.’122 In the 
case of corruption, the responsibility for enforcement necessarily shifts to bureaucratic 
agencies. Certainly, the leading anti-corruption conventions make provision for the 
sharing of information and cooperation between government officials.123 The UN 
Convention devotes an entire chapter of the treaty to the question of international 
cooperation yet, as discussed below, the likelihood of effective cooperation is slim, 
due largely to the nature of transnational corruption. 
B. The Effectiveness of the Anti-Corruption Network 
Transnational corruption is formidably difficult to police, and even an emerging 
network of government agencies is unlikely to be able to effectively control corporate 
behaviour. This is by virtue of the very nature of transnational corruption—it is secret, 
undertaken by well-resourced corporations, and occurs across national boundaries. As 
                                                 
119 Imelda Maher, ‘Competition Law in the International Domain: Networks as a New Form of 
Governance’ (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 111, 114. 
120 Slaughter, above n 10, 46–8. 
121 Posadas notes that even the regional anti-corruption conventions gave rise to networks, suggesting 
the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption had ‘the effect of creating an “Inter-American 
network” for international legal cooperation in fighting corruption’: Posadas, above n 1, 394. 
122 Robert O Keohane and Joseph S Nye, ‘Transgovernmental Relations and International 
Organizations’ (1974) 27(1) World Politics 39, 59. 
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Caiden notes, ‘[a]s difficult as it is to uncover corruption in the public sector, 
duplicating such performance in the private sector is decidedly more difficult.’124 
A number of scholars suggest that one of the defining characteristics of bribery is its 
secrecy.125 Certainly, TNCs, conscious of the illegality of corruption, bring their 
significant resources to bear to conceal their acts. As a result, bribes often move 
through many hands in many countries before reaching their final destination.126 
Goodyear International Corporation, for example, channelled funds to a Goodyear 
executive, then through a Greek marketing company, before the bribe was ultimately 
paid to an Iraqi official.127 As Braithwaite notes, ‘[b]ecause of the inherent and 
contrived complexity associated with the biggest abuses of organizational power, 
probabilities of detection and conviction fall.’128 The history of the FCPA, largely 
because of such complexity, is chequered with a significant number of cases where 
prosecutors were unable to provide sufficient evidence to sustain a prosecution.129 
While empirical data on the incidence of bribery and corruption is difficult to gather, 
due to its secrecy and illegality,130 the available evidence indicates the FCPA has not 
been very successful in altering US business practices.131 Studies undertaken for the 
World Bank indicate that US businesses continue to engage in bribery in transition 
                                                                                                                                            
123 Posadas, above n 1, 392; Windsor and Getz, above n 33, 763; OECD Convention, above n 22, art 9; 
UN Convention Against Corruption, above n 21, arts 43–50. 
124 Gerald E Caiden, ‘Ten Major Flaws in Combating Corruption’ (2004) 10 Southwestern Journal of 
Law and Trade in the Americas 269, 278. 
125 Fort and Noone, above n 59, 536–7. See also Windsor and Getz, above n 33, 750–1. 
126 For a description of a number of cases brought under the FCPA, see Corr and Lawler, above n 46, 
1273–95. 
127 Ibid, 1286–7. 
128 John Braithwaite, ‘On Speaking Softly and Carrying Big Sticks: Neglected Dimensions of a 
Republican Separation of Powers’ (1997) 47 University of Toronto Law Review 305, 325. 
129 Corr and Lawler, above n 46, 1273–95. 
130 Winsdor and Getz, above n 33, 750–1. 
131 Ouzounov, above n 17, 1193; Steven Salbu, ‘Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ (1997) 54 Washington and Lee Law Review 229, 231. 
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economies.132 Moreover, as Posadas notes, despite having criminalised foreign 
bribery for over 25 years, the US continues to rank relatively poorly on Transparency 
International’s Bribe Payers Index.133 Moreover, the fact that US business lobbied to 
spread the prohibition of foreign bribery abroad suggests only that US corporations 
perceived a disadvantage, not that they had altered their behaviour.134 It appears, 
therefore, that the FCPA has been unable to control US business. 
Transgovernmental networks may encourage transboundary cooperation, but they 
cannot erase borders altogether. The limits of state power are conspicuous in attempts 
to address corruption. Where the relevant circumstances occur in multiple 
jurisdictions, with differing laws regarding accounting provisions and bank secrecy,135 
maintaining an effective investigation continues to be difficult even in a cooperative 
network. Thus even where the US had full assistance from other nations in the 
investigation of FCPA violations, convictions were nonetheless difficult to secure.136 
Furthermore, many of the relevant acts occur in developing nations, where complicit 
officials and weak institutions can frustrate effective investigation.137  
                                                 
132 Hellman, Joel S, Jones, Geraint and Kaufmann, Daniel, ‘Far from Home: Do Foreign Investors 
Import Higher Standards of Governance in Transition Economies?’ (Policy Research Working Paper, 
The World Bank, 2002). See also Joel S Hellman, Geraint Jones and Daniel Kaufmann, ‘Are Foreign 
Investors and Multinationals Engaging in Corrupt Practices in Transition Economies?’ (2000) 11 
Transition: The Newsletter About Reforming Economies 4. 
133 Posadas, above n 1, 412. 
134 Some scholars, nonetheless, suggest that business lobbying is indicative that the FCPA has had at 
least some effect: Corr and Lawler, above n 46. This argument is also canvassed, though not 
specifically endorsed by Windsor and Getz, and Posadas: Windsor and Getz, above n 33, 760; Posadas, 
above n 1, 358–9. Clearly, US businesses which engage in bribery in violation of the FCPA assumed 
some risk, which would be motivation for spreading that same risk to competitors. It does not, however, 
demonstrate that US businesses stopped engaging in corruption. 
135 The UN Convention makes provision for cooperation irrespective of bank secrecy laws: UN 
Convention Against Corruption, above n 21, arts 40, 46(8). However, these provisions are non-specific, 
and given that nations such as Switzerland have long protested any attempt to erode their bank secrecy 
laws, differences will inevitably continue. 
136 Corr and Lawler, above n 46, 1273–95. 
137 Koenig-Archibugi, above n 103, 240; Ouzounov, above n 17. 
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These investigative difficulties are exacerbated by the size and power of transnational 
corporations. The corporate collapses of recent years demonstrate how difficult it is to 
enforce legislation against powerful corporations in purely domestic situations, let 
alone across national borders, and regulators persistently suffer from information 
asymmetries. Monitoring large and complex corporations is difficult, and 
concealment of suspect payments relatively easy.138 In fact, as Corr and Lawler note, 
‘[v]iolations of the FCPA are generally brought to the attention of authorities by 
whistleblowers or disgruntled former employees.’139 The heavy reliance on 
whistleblowing suggests the failure of investigative regulatory techniques. This 
suspicion is reinforced by the fact that, despite a World Bank survey indicating that 
approximately 40 percent of companies pay bribes, there have been less than 50 
convictions under the FCPA since 1990.140 These figures suggest that the great 
majority of bribes go undiscovered and unpunished. 
If one accepts that corporations are profit-seeking rational actors, one would expect 
they would weigh the benefits of bribery against its costs. Rose-Ackerman, following 
this logic, suggests that ‘[t]he expected cost of bribery is the probability of being 
caught times the probability of being convicted times the punishment levied.’141 Thus 
far, the international legal regime has focussed on the punishment levied; ensuring 
that states recognise foreign bribery as a crime. Yet when the benefits of bribery are 
so great,142 and the likelihood of detection and conviction so low,143 rational 
                                                 
138 Braithwaite, above n 128, 325. 
139 Corr and Lawler, above n 46, 1275. 
140 The survey is reported in Windsor and Getz, above n 33, 752. For a breakdown of convictions and 
pleas under the FCPA since 1990, see Danforth Newcomb and Stephen Fishbein, ‘The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act: Recent Trends and Patterns’ (Client Publication, Shearman and Sterling LLP, 2004) < 
http://www.shearman.com/documents/LT_fall2004.pdf> at 2 June 2005. 
141 Rose-Ackerman (1997), above n 33, 40. 
142 The revenues associated with bribery appear to be twenty to a hundred times the amount of the 
payment: Posadas, above n 1, 355. Posadas draws his information from the 1970s US Congressional 
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corporations will continue to bribe even where the potential punishments are severe. 
Moreover, even when such punishments are considerable, the resources of TNCs are 
such that they are able to absorb legal costs and adverse judgements as part of their 
operating costs.144 While cooperation through a network will most likely improve 
enforcement mechanisms, it is unlikely to do so sufficiently to alter corporate 
behaviour. 
Enforcement of extraterritorial anti-corruption laws, even through the mechanism of a 
transgovernmental enforcement network, faces systemic difficulties. Relying solely 
on the threat of sanctions is unlikely to influence a ‘rational actor’ corporation, as the 
likelihood of detection is low. Corporations and their constituents, however, are not 
purely rational actors. They are capable of socialisation through norm-creation. It is 
through a focus on this mechanism that corporate behaviour is most likely to be 
altered. These ‘soft law’ mechanisms will be considered in the following chapter. 
C. Legitimacy and Networks 
Networks, including the anti-corruption network, are confronted not only by questions 
of effectiveness, but also by questions of legitimacy. This distinction is sometimes 
phrased in terms of ‘input legitimacy’ (the accountability of the actors and process), 
as against ‘output legitimacy’ (the consequences).145 Much of the literature on 
networks has privileged consequences alone, narrowing governance to a purely 
                                                                                                                                            
hearings on corruption, but there seems little reason to think that such ratios would have changed. See 
also Windsor and Getz, above n 33, 757. 
143 Since 1990, even in the small number of cases where the Department of Justice has brought charges 
for breach of the FCPA, only 8 percent have resulted in convictions, and 54 percent in pleas: Newcomb 
and Fishbein, above n 140. 
144 Contra Corr and Lawler, above n 46, 1324. Corr and Lawler suggest the weighty consequences of a 
convicted breach of the FCPA is enough to deter companies, as is the cost of defending a case.  
145 Benner et al, above n 59, 204. 
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functional question  and ignoring input legitimacy.146 Anne-Marie Slaughter, the 
leading proponent of transgovernmental networks, is not unaware of such 
difficulties.147 Nonetheless, the solutions she proposes are insufficient to remedy the 
underlying legitimacy problems with transgovernmental networks.148 
Robert Keohane suggests there are three procedural criteria for acceptable global 
governance systems: accountability, participation and persuasion.149 Slaughter 
perceives a benefit of transgovernmental networks to be that the bureaucrats involved 
remain accountable to legislatures and, indirectly, citizens.150 Following that same 
logic, Lawrence Tshuma suggests ‘the transgovernmental approach has the virtue of 
ensuring accountability of national regulators to the electorate.’151 However, as many 
commentators have noted, the accountability of regulators is far from assured by 
virtue of being part of government. In the words of Imelda Maher, ‘any democratic 
accountability is indirect at best.’152 
Regulators are only democratically sanctioned through a chain of accountability, first 
to the legislature, and through the legislature to the citizenry. As with any such 
indirect process, long chains of responsibility dilute democratic influence. As 
Keohane suggests, ‘[c]hains of delegation are long, and some of their links are hidden 
behind a veil of secrecy.’153 Moreover, regulators acting internationally operate at an 
                                                 
146 For discussion, see ibid, 207. 
147 Slaughter, above n 10, 216–60. 
148 Kenneth Anderson, ‘Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance through 
Global Government Networks (Review of Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order)’ (2005) 118 
Harvard Law Review 1255, 1301–10. 
149 Keohane, above n 105, 3. 
150 Anderson, above n 148, 1311: ‘A New World Order was written partly in response to critics ... who 
attacked forms of global governance that transferred power to unaccountable NGOs and private 
groups’. 
151 Tshuma, above n 59, 128. 
152 Maher, above n 119, 135. 
153 Keohane, above n 105, 9. 
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even further remove from citizens than those acting only within the state.154 
Regulators acting internationally are often semi-autonomous, and working in fields 
characterised by technical complexity, and hence it is difficult for citizens to remain 
fully informed about regulatory decisions and more difficult still to hold the regulators 
directly accountable.155 These two mechanisms—the flow of information and the 
capacity to sanction the relevant actors—are two crucial aspects of accountability.156 
Without them, the claim to democratic accountability is dubious at best.157 
Not only are the links between citizens and regulators problematic in 
transgovernmental networks, so too are the links between the legislature and the 
regulators. The very nature of transgovernmental networks is that they anticipate 
independent linkages between bureaucrats, and an associated community-building 
element. This has led White to conclude, in the field of financial regulation, that ‘a 
community of central bankers and regulators has emerged whose shared values may 
give them more in common than they may have with various parts of their national 
government.’158 Similarly, Anderson suggests that regulators in a transgovernmental 
network have a tendency to drift away from accountability through the state over 
time.159 Given an already burgeoning regulatory state, ‘[f]or top leaders this leads to 
the further problem of losing control over their own sprawling and governmentally 
                                                 
154 Richard B Stewart, ‘Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century’ (2003) 78 New York 
University Law Review 437, 459. 
155 Picciotto, above n 59, 1049–50. 
156 Koenig-Archibugi, above n 103, 237–8. 
157 These problems are not unique to transnational networks, and may be manifested in many agencies 
in a regulatory state. They are, however, particularly pronounced in transgovernmental networks. 
158 White, William R, ‘International Agreements in the Area of Banking and Finance: 
Accomplishments and Outstanding Issues’ (Working Paper No. 38, Bank for International Settlements, 
Monetary and Economic Department, 1996), 20. 
159 Anderson, above n 148, 1301–10. 
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active bureaucracies.’160 Though regulators may, in principle, be restricted by a chain 
of accountability, the effective functioning of that chain is questionable. 
In examining Keohane’s second procedural requirement, participation, networks raise 
further issues. Benner et al identify a dual participatory gap in the operation of 
networks; first, in the gap between those marginalised and those empowered by the 
international system, and second, in the gap between those within the networks and 
those (such and legislatures and NGOs) excluded from the networks.161 This is not a 
point lost on Slaughter. Indeed, in relation to the competition policy network, she has 
warned of the dangers of the politics of insulation, where networks are restricted to 
the powerful, and policy imposition, where powerful nations attempt to impose their 
models of governance on weaker nations.162 In A New World Order, however, 
Slaughter nevertheless goes on to suggest that the exercise of power is ineradicable, 
and that networks are at least as equitable as other international institutions.163 She is 
clearly correct in noting that power exists as a subtext of all relations between states. 
Yet, examining the manner in which such power is exercised is nonetheless an 
important endeavour, and one which raises contentious issues. 
It is the manner in which power is exercised that is the thrust of Keohane’s third 
procedural requirement—persuasion. Following Foucault, one could suggest that any 
social relations, be it between nations or individuals, is characterised by power.164 
                                                 
160 Keohane and Nye, above n 122, 61. 
161 Benner et al, above n 59, 195. 
162 Slaughter, Anne-Marie, ‘Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks’ in 
Michael Byers (ed), The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and 
International Law (2000) 180. See also Slaughter, above n 10, 227–30; Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘The 
Accountability of Government Networks’ 8 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 347 (2001). 
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However, some acts of power are widely considered legitimate. Keohane, for example, 
suggests ‘voluntary cooperation based on honest communication and rational 
persuasion provides the strongest guarantee of a legitimate process’,165 even though 
persuasion is, in the broad sense, an exercise of power. Given the participatory gaps 
identified above, one can question the extent to which the power exercised in 
networks is legitimate. For example, a network may function to circumvent official 
state consent, rather than acting as a vehicle for rational persuasion.166 Networks, 
therefore, exhibit a potential for abuse and may be illegitimate conduits of power. 
D. Legitimacy and the Anti-Corruption Network 
The criticisms of networks elucidated above are general, and their application to the 
anti-corruption network remains to be demonstrated. Some of the general criticisms of 
networks are mitigated by the existence of many formal and highly-subscribed 
conventions on corruption. This certainly diminishes the secrecy and informality that 
a number of authors find least palatable about transgovernmental networks.167 Yet, as 
Picciotto notes, most international agreements that sit behind transgovernmental 
networks are general in their terms.168 The UN Convention, for example, while 
obliging signatories to prohibit foreign bribery, provides little detail on the nature of 
such a prohibition or the mechanisms for enforcement. The process of developing 
specific content to accompany general obligations occurs through the 
                                                 
165 Keohane, above n 105, 10. Notably, this is consistent with the concept of ‘communicative 
rationality’ as expressed by Habermas: Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to 
a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (William Rehg trans, 1996 ed) [trans of: Faktizität und 
Geltung]. 
166 Slaughter notes that networks of regulators may operate to circumvent their own legislatures, though 
she suggests that this is for the purposes of speed and effectiveness: Slaughter, above n 10, 49. 
167 See, for example, Keohane, above n 105, 9; Picciotto, above n 59, 1047–50. 
168 Picciotto, above n 59, 1050. 
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transgovernmental network.169 Hence, as Picciotto notes, ‘[l]aw may oil the wheels, 
but it does not alter the structure of the machinery.’170 
Given that regulatory officials will be making substantive decisions regarding 
corruption and bribery including, in marginal cases, what actually constitutes bribery, 
their democratic accountability remains an issue.171 In addition to the accountability 
issues noted above, another particular problem occurs in the case of anti-corruption 
regulators. A disjuncture exists between those who exercise the material power to 
regulate, and those who are subject to it. Regulators in the developed world, where 
most TNCs make their homes,172 engage in regulation with a tangible effect in the 
developing world, where much bribery occurs. If one views the citizens of the 
developing world as subjects of such regulation, as well as corporations, this does not 
simply stretch the chain of accountability between the regulators and their subjects, it 
may break it entirely. 
Given, however, the growing consensus across the developing and developed world 
about the legitimacy of anti-corruption legislation,173 it seems inappropriate to 
overemphasise the possibility of unaccountable regulators overusing their anti-
corruption powers. Rather, the more pertinent concern is that such regulators may 
under-enforce the anti-corruption legislation.174 This is particularly problematic given 
the capacity to regulate transnational corporation is, at best, limited. Vigorous 
                                                 
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid. 
171 The definitions of bribery provided in the leadings conventions are not always definitive, leaving 
some scope for regulators to decide which cases to pursue. See for example, UN Convention Against 
Corruption, above n 21, art 16. 
172 Windsor and Getz, above n 33, 765. 
173 See above n 95 and associated text. 
174 Corr and Lawler, above n 46, 1320: ‘there are those who warn of the danger of over-legislation and 
under-enforcement’. 
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enforcement, therefore, may not be forthcoming from regulators who are at arms 
length from citizens who desire the limitation of corruption. 
Conclusion 
The key international anti-corruption conventions contemplate and, when effective, 
will cultivate a series of relations which are consistent with Slaughter’s concept of a 
transgovernmental enforcement network. This network, however, is likely to be of 
dubious efficacy in the face of powerful TNCs operating across multiple jurisdictions. 
Hence, measures to complement the emerging transgovernmental network of anti-
corruption regulators are necessary, and one such measure is considered in the 
following chapter. 
The legitimacy of transgovernmental networks is also uncertain. Some authors have 
noted that it is important not to compare networks against an ‘ideal-type national 
democracy’ as ‘networked governance does not pretend to organise a perfectly 
democratic process at the transnational level.’175 Conversely, however, scholars 
should not close their eyes to the accountability flaws of transgovernmental networks. 
Recognition of such limitations encourages the development of new mechanisms by 
which to enhance democracy in international governance. Increased involvement of 
non-state actors can provide some additional legitimacy to an anti-corruption regime, 
and one means of including these actors is considered in the following chapter. 
 
                                                 
175 Benner et al, above n 59, 206. See also Keohane, above n 105, 9: ‘International institutions will 
probably never meet the standards of electoral accountability and participation that we expect of 
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of Soft Power’ in Sanjeev Khagram, James V Riker and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), Restructuring World 
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IV.  SOFT LAW, NORMS AND CORPORATE 
BEHAVIOUR 
Introduction 
Transnational corruption, as with many other global problems, involves a plurality of 
relevant actors—states, officials, regulators, non-government organisations, civil 
society and, not least, transnational corporations. Yet despite the centrality of such 
non-state actors, much of the literature on corruption has neglected any close analysis 
of them. One notable exception is Braithwaite and Drahos’ consideration of 
‘regulatory webs’, constituted by a multiplicity of actors and often operating through 
dialogue and persuasion rather than coercion. These webs function through the use of 
soft power to shape corporate behaviour, particularly through the redefinition of 
interests and through reputational sanctions. These soft law mechanisms, often 
discussed by scholars in terms of state compliance with international law,176 can 
likewise be applied to transnational corporations. 
Whilst regulatory webs demonstrate the possibility of non-state global regulation, 
they are far from a panacea. The mechanisms used in regulatory webs are not 
universally applicable to corporations, and the webs themselves continue to suffer 
from problems of legitimacy. A comprehensive approach to the regulation of 
transnational corporations, therefore, should incorporate both state-based and non-
state regulation in combination. One method which may be appropriate to such an 
enterprise is Braithwaite’s notion of ‘enforced self-regulation’.177 More important, 
                                                 
176 See for example, Peter M Haas, ‘Choosing to Comply: Theorizing from International Relations and 
Comparative Politics’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding 
Norms in the International Legal System (2000) 43. 
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however, than specific models is a recognition that soft, non-state mechanisms of 
regulation can have significant effects. 
A. Non-State Actors and ‘Regulatory Webs’ 
In Global Business Regulation, Braithwaite and Drahos consider the manner in which 
regulatory regimes are formed by the work of a variety of actors.178 They explicitly 
reject Slaughter’s model of transgovernmental networks.179 Their counter-metaphor is 
that of ‘regulatory webs’, constituted by both states and non-state actors. Braithwaite 
and Drahos suggest, pithily, that ‘[s]omething as hard to achieve as the globalization 
of regulation seems to require a web of influences—many actors deploying many 
mechanisms.’180 These actors include non-government organisations, civil society and 
even corporations themselves. The regulatory webs become a locus of soft power, 
influencing the behaviour of corporations without recourse to explicitly coercive hard 
power. 
Braithwaite and Drahos’ analysis builds upon an existing body of literature on the use 
of norms as a regulatory form. For example, Robert Ellickson, in his work Order 
Without Law, considers the role that law and norms play, alternately or in 
combination, in the regulation of individual behaviour.181 Drawing upon the value of 
norms in the domestic sphere, scholars such as Parker and Braithwaite have advocated 
dialogic mechanisms of corporate regulation that, through consultation between 
corporations and regulators, enhance the likelihood of compliance.182 These 
mechanisms operate through the redefinition of internal corporate interests, rather 
                                                 
178 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 11. 
179 Ibid, 479. 
180 Ibid, 31. 
181 Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbours Settle Disputes (1991). 
182 Christine Parker, The Open Corporation (2002); Braithwaite, above n 128. 
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than simply through the external applications of legal sanctions.183 Concurrently with 
this analysis, international relations literature has considered the manner in which soft 
power influences the behaviour of states, redefining their interests and altering their 
behaviour.184 In the absence of an international sovereign to exercise coercive power, 
it has become necessary to look to other means of controlling the behaviour of 
international actors. These means stand above and apart from the traditional powers of 
the state. 
Braithwaite and Drahos have considered the use of ‘dialogic webs’ to generate 
compliance in the international sphere, where the powers of individual states remain 
limited.185 These webs, operating through persuasion rather than coercion, can 
effectively globalise practice without recourse to state-promulgated rules. A number 
of dialogic mechanisms of this type are already in existence. The Global Reporting 
Initiative, for example, in consultation with civil society, encourages corporations to 
institute reporting processes for a number of activities, both economic and social.186 
Likewise, The Global Compact, a voluntary initiative in which businesses undertake 
to observe ten principles covering human rights, labour standards, the environment 
and corruption, has been described by its architect as a ‘social learning network’.187 
Determining the effectiveness of webs of this type, particularly with regards to 
corruption, requires an examination of how they operate. Four mechanisms assist the 
effective operation of dialogic webs; the manner in which epistemic communities 
redefine interests, the use of reputation as a restraint on behaviour, the creation of 
                                                 
183 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 11, 553–4. 
184 See especially, the literature on ‘social constructivism’, including Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is 
what States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’ (1992) 46 International 
Organization 391. 
185 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 11, 553–7. 
186 Benner et al, above n 59, 202–3. See also www.globalreporting.org. 
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intellectual resources valuable to corporations, and the manner in which habitual 
compliance can be incorporated into organisational routines. 
A.i Epistemic Communities and Business Regulation 
Peter Haas has identified what he terms ‘epistemic communities’—networks of 
individuals with shared beliefs and expertise on a given issue.188 They include 
professionals from government, civil society and corporations themselves, united by a 
shared interest in the process of regulation. Epistemic communities, through their 
expertise, control the diffusion of ideas and knowledge which ‘can lead to new 
patterns of behaviour and prove to be an important determinant of international policy 
coordination.’189 In particular, these communities influence the manner in which 
problems are perceived, and the scope of potential solutions envisioned by relevant 
actors.190 Epistemic communities are particularly important for issue-definition.191 
Only once problems are broadly identified and accepted can actors begin to formulate 
collective solutions and standards of behaviour. In the case of corporate corruption, 
this process involves the recognition of corruption as a problem and collective 
understandings of how to approach it. 
Epistemic communities successfully communicate norms because they emphasise 
dialogue with corporations, which can foster internal norms of compliance.192 This 
represents a significant improvement on traditional coercive regulatory methods, 
which can give rise to ‘reactance’—uncooperative responses to forceful external 
                                                                                                                                            
187 John Gerard Ruggie, quoted in Koenig-Archibugi, above n 103, 255. See also 
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pressure.193 Therefore, as Braithwaite suggests, ‘using reasoning in preference to 
power-assertion tends to promote [compliance].’194 For example, where management 
officials invest in the creation of standards, they demonstrate a greater likelihood of 
complying with them.195 Corporate involvement in the creation of standards also 
increases the likelihood that those standards are tailored to the needs of 
corporations.196 Consequently, one of the strengths of dialogic webs lies in their 
inclusion of corporate actors. 
Internal compliance constituencies—those responsible for the implementation of 
corporate standards or codes—form an important element of any epistemic 
community. Parker, in reviewing empirical studies of self-regulatory schemes, has 
identified these constituencies as a key contributing factor to compliance among 
corporations.197 In the case of corruption, the FCPA has already encouraged a body of 
such professionals.198 Motorola, for example, has financial specialists checking for 
accounting discrepancies which could result from corruption.199 Once established, 
internal compliance bodies are integrated into existing epistemic communities of 
compliance professionals. Hence, as Parker suggests, they become ‘conduit[s] of 
information, skills and concerns from external groups such as regulators, public 
interest groups, and communities of professional experts that significantly shapes the 
                                                 
193 Braithwaite, above n 128, 314–24; Ayres and Braithwaite, above n 12, 49. 
194 Braithwaite, above n 128, 321–2. 
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way in which the company handles legal compliance and social responsibility.’200 
Consistent with this role, these groups tend to view their professional duty as ensuring 
compliance, rather than maximising profit.201 Accordingly, such constituencies 
contribute to an internal impetus towards compliance. 
An epistemic community focussing on corruption has existed for some years.202 A 
number of international actors, including the International Chamber of Commerce 
(‘ICC’) and Transparency International, have begun to develop a body of expertise on 
corruption. In particular, this expertise is manifested in the model corporate codes 
which are promulgated by these organisations, discussed below. One measure of 
success of this epistemic community has been the resurgence of interest in corruption, 
and the growing number of voluntarily-signed corporate codes on corruption.203 The 
International Chamber of Commerce, in particular, has been active in setting 
standards expected of its members.204 Transparency International, in turn, has not only 
promulgated codes of behaviour, but has also attempted to use publicity to hold 
corporations reputationally accountable for breaches of expected standards of 
behaviour.205 
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201 Empirical studies of the pharmaceutical industry support this contention: Braithwaite, above n 177, 
1479; Ayres and Braithwaite, above n 12, 125–6. 
202 A defining moment was the establishment of Transparency International in 1993. See 
www.transparency.org.  
203 Kathryn Gordon and Maiko Miyake, ‘Business Approaches to Combating Bribery: A Study of 
Codes of Conduct’ (2001) 34 Journal of Business Ethics 161; Ronald Berenbiem, Company Programs 
for Resisting Corrupt Practices: A Global Study (2000). 
204 International Chamber of Commerce, ‘Corporate Misconduct is Unacceptable, Say ICC Leaders’ 
(Press Release, 16 December 2002) 
<http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news_archives/2002/stories/corp_govn_dec.asp> at 5 June 2005. 
205 See, for one example, the Transparency International Press Release on Alcatel: Transparency 
International, ‘Recent High-Level Bribery Allegations Highlight Disregard for International Anti-
Corruption Laws’ (Press Release, 29 October 2004) 
<http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2004/2004.10.29.alcatel.html> at 3 June 2005. 
Transnational Corruption  June 2005 
 
 
 - 46 - 
A.ii Reputation as a Restraint on Behaviour 
Reputation acts as a restraint on corporate behaviour in situations of ‘complex 
interdependence’. Formulated initially by Keohane and Nye, complex 
interdependence describes the manner in which actors rely on each other for 
cooperation in a range of areas over significant periods of time.206 The 
interrelationships of these areas is such that to gain the benefits of one cooperative 
scheme, an actor may have to suffer the negative consequences of another. 
Conversely, where an actor, such as a corporation, defaults on one obligation it may 
suffer in other areas.207 Hence, corporations may take on obligations which do no 
appear to be in their direct interests, as part of a larger, beneficial cooperative whole. 
Often invoked as an explanation of state behaviour,208 Braithwaite and Drahos note 
that complex interdependence can be equally applied to transnational corporations.209 
Much like states, corporations benefit from predictable and consistent business 
standards, and can submit to some disagreeable rules for the benefit of an ordered 
whole. 
Reputation is valuable to corporations not only as a result of interdependence, but also 
as a result of public pressure. Where corporations fail to meet accepted standards, 
international bodies such as Transparency International can, and do, bring public 
pressure to bear against them.210 For many companies, the public perception of fault is 
incentive enough to reform their policies, as their reputation is a valuable commodity 
in the marketplace. For example, Lockheed, in the wake of the 1970s bribery scandals 
completely reformed their compliance policies in order to restore the company’s 
                                                 
206 Robert O Keohane and Joseph S Nye, Power and Interdependence (1989). 
207 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 11, 553. 
208 Keohane, above n 105, 7; Abbott and Snidal, above n 50, 427; Haas, above n 176, 63. 
209 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 11. 
Transnational Corruption  June 2005 
 
 
 - 47 - 
reputation.211 Other corporations, such as Shell and Nike, have found themselves 
injured by consumer backlashes in the wake of public scandals, and made efforts to 
reform their policies.212 Reputational consequences not only attach to the corporation 
as a whole, but also to corporate executives among their peers.213 Meetings such as 
the World Economic Forum provide a vehicle for the praise or reprimand of 
executives by other executives.214 Executives therefore, on their own behalf and on 
behalf of their corporation, make significant efforts to advertise their compliance with 
expected standards of behaviour.215 
Two qualifications should be noted to the effectiveness of reputation as an 
accountability mechanism. First, it is only effective insofar as corporations value their 
reputation.216 While Nike, as a corporation heavily dependent on consumer sentiment, 
may be vulnerable to negative publicity, other corporations without such 
dependencies may not. Furthermore, corporations may respond with public relations 
exercises rather than genuine reform.217 Continued oversight by organisations such as 
Transparency International provides some measure of protection against these 
                                                                                                                                            
210 Benner et al, above n 50, 200. See also Parker, above n 182, 56–7. 
211 Braithwaite, above n 128, 334. Similar reform was undertaken by Baker Hughes subsequent to 
revelations that company had engaged in corruption: ‘The Short Arm of the Law’, The Economist, 28 
February 2002 <http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1010969> at 3 June 2005. 
212 ‘Doing Well by Doing Good’, above n 199; ‘The Worm That Never Dies’, The Economist, 28 
February 2002 <http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1011076> at 3 June 2005. 
213 Corporate epistemic communities, in this sense, are analogous to the transnational communities of 
state officials discussed by Keohane: Keohane, above n 105, 7. 
214 See <www.weforum.org>. 
215 Note, for example, the statements of Lee Tashjian, head of communications at Fluor Corporation, on 
its corruption policy: World Economic Forum, Tackling Corruption is Good for Business 
<http://www.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/Content/Tackling+corruption+is+good+for+business> 
at 3 June 2005. 
216 Benner et al, above n 50, 200. 
217 Koenig-Archibugi also notes that negative publicity ‘suffers from the fact that the people who are 
able to punish companies (eg consumers in rich countries) are frequently not the same people whose 
interests the codes are supposed to protect (eg workers and communities in developing countries)’: 
Koenig-Archibugi, above n 103, 257. 
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circumventions. While reputational accountability is not without its flaws, it does 
contribute another strand to the web of regulatory influences.218 
A.iii Intellectual Resources for Corporations 
Dialogic webs produce not only behavioural norms, but also authoritative information. 
This information, in turn, has a value for corporations in the creation of their internal 
policies. Instead of investing heavily in their own compliance procedures, 
corporations are able to draw upon the resources provided by non-government 
organisations.219 Hence, such organisations engage in a form of private capacity-
building, making it easier for corporations to regulate themselves.220 The credible and 
authoritative information provided by non-government organisations is at a premium 
in a globalised world where there is an oversupply of information.221 Hence, as 
Keohane and Nye note, ‘[i]nternational secretariats staffed with knowledgeable 
individuals, even without traditional sources of power, have the opportunity to place 
themselves at the center of crucial communications networks, and thereby acquire 
influence as brokers, facilitators, and suggestors of new approaches.’222  
In the case of corruption, corporations have already demonstrated a willingness to 
draw upon such resources. The ICC Rules of Conduct, discussed below, have formed 
the blueprint for an array of corporate codes.223 Similarly, the Partnering Against 
Corruption Initiative launched by the World Economic Forum is based on a model 
                                                 
218 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 11, 555. 
219 Generally, firms have to invest in the acquisition of expertise: Gordon and Miyake, above n 203, 
166. 
220 For a discussion of capacity building in the context of compliance, see Braithwaite and Drahos, 
above n 11, 555. 
221 Robert O Keohane and Joseph S Nye, ‘Power and Interdependence in the Information Age’ (1998) 
77 Foreign Affairs 81, 86; Keohane and Nye, transgovernmental relations, 52; Maher, above n 119, 118. 
222 Keohane and Nye, above n 105, 55. 
223 Harms, above n 7, 175. 
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code developed by Transparency International.224 Worth examining are the three 
leading approaches to the self-regulation of transnational corruption; the International 
Chamber of Commerce Rules of Conduct,225 Hess and Dunfee’s C2 principles,226 and 
the Transparency International ‘Integrity Pact’ and ‘Business Principles’.227 
The International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Conduct (‘Rules’) have existed 
since 1977, and saw their latest incarnation in 1999.228 The Rules are designed to be 
‘of a general nature constituting what is considered good commercial practice in the 
matters to which they relate but without direct legal effect.’229 The Rules prohibit 
extortion and bribery for any purpose, call for independent and thorough auditing 
techniques, and establish a Standing Committee to promote their adoption. The Rules 
are designed to promote individual codes within companies,230 and the Standing 
Committee is charged with assisting companies in drawing up their own codes.231 
                                                 
224 World Economic Forum, ‘Partnering Against Corruption Initiative’ 
<http://www.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/Content/Partnering+Against+Corruption> at 3 June 
2005. 
225 International Chamber of Commerce, Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions, (1999 edition) 
<http://www.iccwbo.org/home/statements_rules/rules/1999/briberydoc99.asp> at 5 June 2005. 
226 David Hess and Thomas Dunfee, ‘ Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach: The C2 Principles’ 
(2000) 33 Cornell International Law Journal 593. 
227 Transparency International, Integrity Pact and Public Contracting 
<http://www.transparency.org/integrity_pact/index.html> at 5 June 2005; Transparency International, 
Business Principles for Countering Bribery (2002) 
<http://www.transparency.org/building_coalitions/private_sector/business_principles.html> at 5 June 
2005. 
228 An authoritative description of the history of the ICC Rules is provided by Francois Vincke, ‘How 
Effective is the Business Community in Combating Corruption?’ in Stuart Marc Weiser, ‘Dealing with 
Corruption: Effectiveness of Existing Regimes on Doing Business’ (1997) 91 American Society of 
International Law Proceedings 99. Vincke was the chair of the ICC Ad Hoc Committee on Extortion 
and Bribery in International Business Transactions, which sat from 1994 to 1996, and the subsequent 
standing committee. See also, Heimann, above n 198, 150–2; Salbu, above n 26, 456–8; Posadas, above 
n 1, 407–8; Shihata, above n 15, 474; Harms, above n 7, 175. 
229 International Chamber of Commerce, Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions, (1999 edition) 
Pt II, Introduction [2] <http://www.iccwbo.org/home/statements_rules/rules/1999/briberydoc99.asp> at 
5 June 2005. 
230 Shihata, above n 15, 474. 
231 Vincke, above n 228, 105. 
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Building off the ICC Rules and other corporate codes such as the Sullivan and 
McBride Principles, Hess and Dunfee have developed a twelve-point set of principles, 
labelled the C2 Principles (Combating Corruption) (‘Principles’).232 Hess and Dunfee 
suggest that the Principles aim to place an emphasis on policies, procedures and 
publication.233 Emphasis on policies is designed to prevent a superficial adoption of 
the Principles, and to inform employees of the stance of the company. Procedures are 
designed to attack specific corruption from a number of angles, including through 
accounting provisions and the transparency of payments to agents. Publication seeks 
to make transparent the firm’s efforts against corruption, and to ensure that their 
performance is capable of being independently evaluated. Notably, the Principles 
make no effort to specifically define bribery. As Salbu suggests, ‘whereas the ICC 
approach seems to aim for extreme simplicity, and therefore ease of application, the 
C2 anticorruption Principles are more open-textured and theoretical’.234 
Transparency International has not only developed codes for corporations generally, 
but also for specific procurement projects. Known as Integrity Pacts (‘Pacts’), they 
require any bidders for a government contract to sign a tender document which 
provides undertakings not to engage in bribery, supported by a code of conduct and a 
compliance program.235 Where a company defaults on the undertaking, they open 
themselves to liability for damages and debarment from present and future tenders. 
The Pacts are designed to reintroduce expectations of honesty in tendering processes 
                                                 
232 Hess and Dunfee, above n 226, 619–22. For discussion, see Salbu, above n 26, 458–61; Fort and 
Noone, above n 59, 541; Ouzounov, above n 17, 1199–200. For a discussion of the Sullivan and 
McBride Principles, see Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Rights Codes For Transnational 
Corporations: The Sullivan and MacBride Principles’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), Commitment and 
Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (2000) 418. 
233 Hess and Dunfee, above n 226, 622–3. 
234 Salbu, above n 26, 460. See also Ouzounov, above n 17, 1199. 
235 See Transparency International, Integrity Pact, above n 227. See also Boswell, above n 20, 107; 
Godlbarg, above n 68, 286–7; Posadas, above n 1, 405–7; Harms, above n 7, 208. 
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tainted by expectations of bribery.236 Thus far, the Pacts have only been instituted in a 
limited number of projects, though a growing number of nations have expressed 
support for them.237 
Notable, too, are the efforts of Transparency International in designing the Business 
Principles for Countering Bribery.238 These principles are explicitly designed to assist 
corporations in the development of internal compliance mechanisms, and were 
composed following the OECD Convention, in order to help ensure compliance with 
that convention. These principles, in particular, anticipate a consultative role for 
Transparency International in interacting with business. These efforts, and the others 
noted above, represent an undertaking by international civil society to engage with 
corporations to alter their behaviour. 
A.iv Organisations, Employees and Routine 
Corporate engagement with regulatory webs, be it through the adoption of corporate 
codes or simply through dialogue, operates on corporations from within, redefining 
interests and policies. In this way, regulatory webs are distinct from regulatory 
techniques that focus on external sanctions. Focussing on these internal regulatory 
procedures can help bring about a ‘culture of compliance’.239 In the words of Oran 
Young, ‘rules constitute and essential feature of bureaucracies and ... routinized 
compliance with rules is a deeply ingrained norm among bureaucrats.’240 This is also 
partly due to the fact that decision-making in a large organisation is a significant 
transaction cost, and so ‘organizations internalize rules so that the advantages and 
                                                 
236 Boswell, above n 20, 107. 
237 Posadas, above n 1, 406. 
238 Transparency International, Business Principles, above n 227. 
239 H Lowell Brown, ‘Parent-Subsidiary Liability under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ (1998) 50 
Baylor Law Review 1. 
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disadvantages of compliance need not be recalculated each time they are invoked.’241 
Where internal compliance rules form part of a bureaucratic regime, such as those of 
large corporations, they foster habits of compliance.242 
Changes in policy, including measures such as corporate codes, also have a marked 
effect on the behaviour of employees. Communication of ethical commitments to 
employees opens them to discussion which, in turn, increases the likelihood that 
employees will utilise broader ethical standards.243 Samart Powpaka considered the 
effect of support for bribery on managerial decision-making, and found that reducing 
perceived support reduced the likelihood of bribery.244 Hence, even voluntary self-
regulatory systems can have a pronounced effect on behaviour as part of a regulatory 
web. 
B. The Limits of Soft Power 
Regulatory webs are a valuable means to regulate transnational corporations. 
However, their influence should not be overstated. In the case of corruption, while an 
active web of influences exists, there are significant aspects of corporate practice 
which remain uncontrolled. It is notable, in an international climate where anti-
corruption norms are described by one commentator as ‘morally unassailable’,245 that 
few corporations exhibit any indications of having internalised such norms.246 A gap 
clearly exists between the norm and the behaviour. Michael Reisman, identifies a 
                                                                                                                                            
240 Oran Young, Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory with International Implications (1979) 39. 
241 Abbot and Snidal, above n 50, 429. 
242 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 11, 554–5. 
243 See Parker, above n 182, 34, citing F Bird, The Muted Conscience: Moral Silence and the Practice 
of Ethics in Business (1996). 
244 Samart Powpaka, ‘Factors Affecting Manager’s Decision to Bribe: An Empirical Invesitgation’ 
(2002) 40 Journal of Business Ethics 227, 242. 
245 Bill Shaw, ‘The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Progeny: Morally Unassailable’, (2000) 33 
Cornell International Law Journal 689. 
246 A World Bank survey indicates that approximately 40 percent of companies pay bribes: Windsor 
and Getz, above n 33, 752. 
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divide in corruption between ‘mythical norms’, the overarching set of moral norms, 
and ‘operative codes’, which determine actual behaviour in given circumstances.247 In 
the place of anti-corruption norms, companies generally emphasise operative codes of 
profit-making.248 While companies are prepared to make token gestures, many seem 
reluctant to undertake serious reform.249 
Many observers are, therefore, cynical about the prospects for self-regulatory 
mechanisms, even in the context of a web of regulatory influences. Koenig-Archibugi, 
for example, has suggested such codes ignore the concerns of those not party to their 
drafting, and that self-certification alone is usually insufficient to ensure compliance 
where lax enforcement would be beneficial to the firm.250 Moreover, as noted above, 
reputation is not a universally effective means of controlling corporate behaviour – 
corporations may not care about their reputation, or engage in public relations 
exercises in place of genuine reform. Regulatory webs, therefore, may be a useful, but 
ultimately insufficient means of controlling corporate behaviour. 
C. Private Actors and Accountability 
Regulatory webs, like transgovernmental networks, also face problems of legitimacy. 
As Alfred Aman has noted, ‘[p]ublic law values such as transparency, participation, 
and fairness remain relevant, even though private actors now carry out various tasks 
that can appropriately be called governmental.’251 An assessment of regulatory webs 
must be made on these values. 
                                                 
247 Michael W Reisman, Folded Lies, Bribery, Crusades and Reforms (1979). Luis Moreno Ocampo, 
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Without dispute, a number of the criticisms levelled at transgovernmental networks in 
the previous chapter are applicable to an anti-corruption regulatory web as well. It 
remains the case that citizens lack a means of direct input into the creation of 
regulatory webs, just as they lacked direct input into the substance of 
transgovernmental networks.252 Nevertheless, the inclusion of corporations and, 
indirectly, non-government organisations represents an improvement over purely 
governmental networks. While Slaughter justifiably responded to the lack of 
government in international governance,253 the reintroduction of the state need not 
exclude non-state actors. In fact, the inclusion of global interest networks can enhance 
accountability,254 so long as the state remains involved in the process. So, too, is it 
important to engage corporations in the process of regulation, as they are its most 
direct subjects. 
The existence of dialogue in the webs is a distinct advantage. The engagement 
between government, corporations and civil society provides for much greater mutual 
accountability. Keohane, for one, suggests that ‘[c]riticism, heard and responded to in 
a public space, can help generate accountability’.255 Similarly, an emphasis on 
dialogue is a central element of Habermas’ conception of democracy.256  Regulatory 
webs are far better vehicles for such criticism and dialogue, than government action 
alone. 
                                                 
252 As Benner et al note, ‘two traditional mechanisms of accountability are not applicable in networks: 
electoral accountability and hierarchical accountability’: above n 50, 198. 
253 See above n 150 and associated text. 
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255 Keohane, above n 105, 9. 
256 Habermas, above n 165. 
Transnational Corruption  June 2005 
 
 
 - 55 - 
Nevertheless, while regulatory webs may constitute an improvement on the 
legitimacy of transgovernmental networks, they cannot pretend to meet traditional 
standards of accountability. A ‘democratic deficit’ obtains in all forms of global 
governance, and presents a continuing challenge to international lawyers and policy-
makers.257 Continued attention to such problems is essential, even if solutions are not 
immediately forthcoming. 
D. Combining State and Non-State Regulation 
For reasons of functionality and legitimacy, regulation of transnational corruption 
should attempt to unite the activities occurring on a number of planes. As Braithwaite 
and Drahos note, the state is still one of the primary actors in regulatory webs, and 
their influence should not be underestimated. This paper, therefore, commends an 
approach which links all three planes of analysis – international conventions, 
supported by networked regulatory agencies, combined with regulatory webs. One 
means by which the three planes may be linked is through enforced self-regulation. 
Braithwaite distinguishes enforced self-regulation, which involves state to business 
negotiation, from co-regulation, which involves state negotiation with an entire 
industry sector.258 His model involves compelling individual firms to draft a set of 
rules tailored to the specific circumstances facing the firm, and subject to certain 
minimum standards. Those rules are then sent to the government for approval and 
publication, and thereafter compliance groups internal to the company take on the role 
of enforcement. The role of government is then only to audit the internal compliance 
groups to ensure they have done their work satisfactorily, and to impose sanctions 
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where there has been failure to meet the approved standards.259 The system seeks to 
gain the benefits of self-regulation, while still having the firm hand of government in 
the background to prevent regulatory abuses.260 
This form of regulation would allow for a continued role by the state, but assigns a 
significant role to regulatory webs. By allowing corporations to choose their codes, 
they continue to be involved in dialogic webs which help define their interests and 
internalise commitments. Similarly, non-government organisations would continue to 
provide regulatory assistance in the development of these codes. However, by being 
vested with the force and legitimacy of law, these codes would have an increased 
‘compliance pull’.261 Moreover, by reinforcing self-regulation with the threat of legal 
sanction companies are forced to take their responsibilities seriously.262 These legal 
penalties prevent corporations from manufacturing ‘paper’ compliance solely for 
public relations purposes. Joseph Rees, in examining regulatory arrangements in both 
the nuclear and chemical industries, identified the background threat of legal 
sanctions as a central element of the successful self-regulatory schemes.263 Similarly, 
legal sanctions tend to strengthen the hand of those inside the corporation who 
                                                 
259 For a full account of enforced self-regulation see Braithwaite, above n 177; Ayres and Braithwaite, 
above n 12, 106–9. 
260 Koenig-Archibugi notes that a number of scholars consider such programs a ‘third way’ between the 
poles of command and control regulation and unalloyed self-regulation: Koenig-Archibugi, above n 
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261 A number of scholars suggest that law itself, by virtue of its generally accepted legitimacy, 
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promote compliance,264 and reinforce compliance norms in the web as a whole.265 
Background legal threats, therefore, can supplement and reinforce the regulatory web. 
In combination with threats, rewards can be provided for effective internal 
compliance schemes. For example, US sentencing guidelines for corporations provide 
for a reduction of penalties where companies have strong compliance programs, and 
empirical evidence suggests that this motivated a significant number of corporations 
to enhance or create internal compliance mechanisms.266 For most TNCs, enforced 
self-regulation would be a minimal financial burden. Since most bribery compliance 
programs focus on good accounting practice, ‘implementation programmes in bribery 
might well have stronger, more direct synergies with existing control processes.’267 
Moreover, since TNCs tend to be large and well-resourced, they are also more capable 
of establishing internal compliance programs against corruption.268 Monitoring of 
such programs can occur through two mechanisms – by civil society and consumers 
for companies concerned about their reputation, and by regulators for those 
companies not susceptible to reputational accountability.269 
This, however, is only one potential means of uniting the three planes of regulation. 
Further research is necessary to determine whether enforced self-regulation is entirely 
feasible as a complete regulatory strategy. Other regulatory strategies which harness 
                                                 
264 Heimann, above n 198, 156. 
265 Sunstein, for instance, has considered the manner in which law may, by ‘making a statement’, 
strengthen some norms and weaken others: Cass Sunstein, ‘On the Expressive Function of Law’ (1996) 
144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2021, 2034–5. See also Cass  Sunstein, ‘Social Norms and 
Social Roles’ (1996) 96 Columbia Law Review 903. 
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the power of regulatory webs, and can simultaneously gain the benefits of a state-
backed program, will also represent an improvement on existing regulation.   
Conclusion 
Webs are increasingly influential in the regulation of global business. By uniting 
individually weak strands of soft law vested in non-state actors, the web as a whole 
can influence corporate behaviour. Hence, a comprehensive approach to the 
regulation of foreign bribery should focus on a multiplicity of actors and methods, 
instead of remaining conceptually wedded to the state. Enforced self-regulation is one 
mechanism which may be able to traverse the gap between state and non-state 
regulation. While this form of international regulation, like others, is not without 
problems of legitimacy and accountability, it does represent an improvement through 
the inclusion relevant actors such as corporations and non-government organisations. 
It does so, however, while still maintaining the control and involvement of 
government. As a result, it represents an improvement in both functionality and 
legitimacy compared to alternate proposals. 
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CONCLUSION 
Transnational corruption is one of many regulatory challenges posed by globalisation. 
Its consequences, however, are particularly severe. It inhibits growth, compromises 
political institutions, and obstructs the rule of law. Moreover, it does so primarily in 
the developing world, where all three commodities are in short supply. It is imperative, 
therefore, that regulators utilise every resource available to combat transnational 
corruption. 
In spite of this imperative, many scholars and policy makers continue to be blinded by 
their fidelity to the state. Anne-Marie Slaughter, for example, responds to global 
problems by advocating a renaissance of the state, albeit in the modified form of 
transgovernmental networks. Yet wholly state-based regulation, even in cooperative 
networks, cannot fully control transnational corporations. Regulators confront 
recurring problems with investigations beyond their borders, and struggle to reign in 
corporations of increasing size and complexity. Transnational corruption is a vivid 
illustration of these difficulties. 
In the absence of effective state action, non-state actors have made efforts to fill the 
regulatory vacuum. Organisations such as the International Chamber of Commerce 
and Transparency International have played instrumental roles in setting standards 
and preventing corrupt behaviour. By fashioning soft law mechanisms, such as 
dialogue and reputation, into regulatory webs, these organisations have gone some 
way to controlling corporate behaviour. While these mechanisms are no panacea, they 
are valuable regulatory resources and should be recognised as such. 
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This paper, therefore, advocates an approach which draws upon all the available 
resources, be they vested in states, corporations, or non-state actors. Only through a 
combination of approaches can intractable problems such as transnational corruption 
be addressed. Enforced self-regulation may be one means of uniting state and non-
state approaches, though it, and other mechanisms, necessitate further investigation. 
Future scholarship should also be attentive to the need for legitimacy, particularly 
through democratic accountability. Both transgovernmental networks and regulatory 
webs suffer, in varying degrees, from problems of legitimation. It is easy, in the quest 
for functional regulation, to neglect the importance of regulatory accountability. Yet 
popular control of regulation must remain an important element of any well-rounded 
governance policy. 
The signature of the UN Convention Against Corruption marks an important step 
forward in the fight against corruption. It is not, however, an end point. By harnessing 
new, soft law mechanisms to regulate corporate behaviour, a more comprehensive and 
effective approach is possible. For transnational corruption, such an approach is long 
overdue. 
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